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BLACK GOLD: OPIUM AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF IMPERIAL TRADE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY ASIA

George Chinnery’s portrait of William Jardine (1784-1843) is in many respects typical of British portraiture of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The sitter poses surrounded by the accoutrements of his life’s work, indicating the origins by which he acquired his wealth and status. He is evidently a gentleman of some enterprise and standing, or at least wished to present himself as such. So far, so good – like so many other portraits of its kind. But when one understands who William (later Sir) Jardine is, then a very specific if somewhat unsavoury atmosphere overcomes the scene, with the picture coming alive in a way that initial impressions bely.

Strung across the table can be seen books and papers of various kinds, among them a bundle of correspondence and a ledger in prominent view. On the floor, partly unfurled, resides what is most likely a map or shipping chart. The sitter himself clasps a quill, the tip of which is thoroughly blackened with ink owing to heavy use. With fist clenched, and wearing a concerted if rather enigmatic look; he is a man who means business in every sense of the term. The sitter is none other than William Jardine of Jardine, Matheson & Co., one of the founding partners of what would become one of the largest and most influential private trading firms operating in the China Trade during the nineteenth century.
George Chinnery's portrait of William Jardine (1784-1843) is in many respects typical of British portraiture of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries [Fig. 1]. The sitter poses surrounded by the accoutrements of his life's work, indicating the origins by which he acquired his wealth and status. He is evidently a gentleman of some enterprise and standing, or at least wished to present himself as such. So far, so good – like so many other portraits of its kind. But when one understands who William (later Sir) Jardine is, then a very specific if somewhat unsavoury atmosphere overcomes the scene, with the picture coming alive in a way that initial impressions bely.

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By all accounts Jardine was a serious man. Trained as a surgeon at the University of Edinburgh, and from humble middling circumstances in Dumfriesshire, Scotland, he stumbled into the China Trade first as a surgeon’s mate on a Magniac & Co. ship in 1803, before ‘trading up’, as it were, into the business himself. He got up early, worked all day, and had a reputation for fastidiously in bookkeeping. He had, as Alain Le Pichon has observed, “all the virtues of application and conscientiousness traditionally nurtured by an austere Calvinist upbringing”. These attributes of industry, diligence, sincerity, and prepossessing dignity are all captured wonderfully in this portrait. Although seemingly every bit the upstanding businessman, he and his company were far from uncontroversial. As a dominant agency house in the China Trade, Jardine, Matheson & Co. played a leading hand in the notorious opium trade by British and foreign merchants into Imperial China that, by some estimates, had addicted anywhere between eight and sixteen million Chinese to the drug by the late nineteenth century (about 2-3% of the population). This was a contraband trade in a commodity that at the time was referred to as “black gold”. Indeed, so contentious a matter had the trade in opium become by the 1840s, and so hugely wealthy its traders, that Benjamin Disraeli in his novel Sybil (1845) parodied Jardine’s business partner, James Matheson (1796-1878), as “one McDruggy, fresh from Canton, with a million of opium in each pocket”.

The one feature of the portrait that draws attention to architectural historians is the painting hanging on the back wall. Unlike in so many portraits of its kind, where one might expect to see a grand country pile, or perhaps a substantial London townhouse, or even a classical ruin, here one sees something altogether more mundane. One beholds a series of mere trading facilities – “factories” or Hongs, as such structures were variously known at the time. Moreover, one sees ships, in the form of trading vessels. The scene is distinctive, if a little unusual. It is the Chinese port city of Canton (Guangzhou), in particular the Pearl River and Shamian (sand island) where the foreign traders were forced to reside during the trading season. This was no doubt a deliberate gesture, and one that Jardine himself would have insisted upon, again keen to demonstrate the source of his life’s work and wealth, not its trappings. The image speaks volumes of the connection between the man, his business, and how he wished to be remembered.

The portrait is shown because, in its composition and associations, it makes a salient point about the relationship between architecture and empire in a way currently not well appreciated or understood. In particular, it directs attention to exactly what ‘architecture’ might be considered to be in this relationship. What is presented here is a category of structure/facility that would perhaps otherwise be described as “infrastructure”, but into which “buildings” of various kinds can be located, however mundane. Jardine’s “factory” is one such building, essentially a hybrid or melange, comprising part house, part business premises, and part storage and transhipping depot (godown). To complicate matters further, it is a structure devised and lying precisely between two vastly different cultures: China and Britain. It is clearly a building in the obvious sense of the term, maybe even a work of architecture, but no architects were involved in its design or construction (as with many buildings like it). It does not fit neatly into any genre, style, or movement;
nor can it easily be related to the Western canon. Indeed, it is far from grand or impressive, appearing more confusing, even schizophrenic – what could be described, for lack of a better term, as ‘grey architecture’.

Yet, in its own way, Jardine’s factory is an important building, perhaps one of the most important of all in the relationship between architecture and empire. To quote Mark Crinson: “architecture echoed, inflected and was integral to many of the other practices and relationships that empire required for its furtherance”. If one takes this as given then the type of structure represented by Jardine, Matheson & Co.’s trading facilities suddenly emerges as not only significant but also indispensable. Taken outside traditional scholarly interpretations of building culture and patronage, architectural genius, stylistic and formal influence, and so on – even beyond more recent frames of reference concerning cultural representation and power relations through space – these structures offer new ways of understanding empire as an extended network or “system” of critical relations [Fig. 2]. Indeed, as Sibel Zandi-Sayek has recently remarked, such structures which, after all, made up the majority of colonial building stock, challenge our ways of looking at architecture, forcing us to consider ‘architectural history’ as more the outcome of widespread and diffuse encounters, connections, and transactions than as a linear or sequential process relating to origins or individual design initiatives. This is especially important when moving beyond the nation state as a unit of reference and conceiving of architecture and its history in a global, transnational capacity. In other words, how might one locate ‘architecture’ within and at the intersecting points of the web of local, regional, and global actors and transactions that comprised Jardine’s world?

This problem of the ‘global’ and its myriad connections is something that has exercised mainstream historians of geography and empire for some time, but has as yet made few inroads into architectural history. But architecture may be seen to offer an additional and potentially unique means by which to analyse further the globally networked nature of empire. There are of course numerous ways in which one might do this, but to focus on architecture (with a capital ‘A’) alone would miss many of the less visible but no less significant flows of capital (both economic and knowledge-based) that sustained the British world system in the nineteenth century. The term ‘transaction’ is clearly an important one in this context. The facilities infrastructure of Jardine, Matheson & Co. was essentially one of economic transaction, and the business networks that resulted from this. Its very being was predicated upon the existence and maintenance of such an economy of transactions, of which it emerges primarily as a condensation or physical
manifestation. In this sense, it is all but wholly perfunctory, if not entirely subservient, to the trading network and its economic meanderings and interests.10

But as mundane as this economic functionalism may seem, it too has a peculiar architectural dimension. As the noted business and economic historian David Hancock observed in his important book Citizens of the World (1995), although choosing a location for and erecting a business premises, and arranging its interior for operational efficiency, including training, filing, and cleaning etc., might seem insignificant, it all signalled a continuing, rational, and disciplined revolution in business management techniques and practices that transformed the modern world, creating a “true bred merchant” class, of which Britain was self-evidently a leading exponent.11 William Jardine was an exemplary specimen of precisely this worldly merchant class. As a private agency house, which gained steadily but significantly as the British government reformed and eventually abolished the East India Company’s (EIC) monopoly over trade with India during the early nineteenth century, Jardine, Matheson & Co. made a considerable fortune out of exploiting such business practices through trading opium.

To cut a long and rather complicated story short, as Britain’s trade deficit with China grew throughout the course of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a commodity was needed in exchange for goods purchased in China instead of payment with cash. Britain’s average balance of payments deficit with China during the period 1817-33 ran at anywhere between £800,000 and £3 million per annum.12 As China required very few commodities from either Britain or India, large amounts of gold and silver bullion were used to buy products such as tea and silk for shipment back to markets in Britain, Europe and America. This drain on cash reserves caused consternation among both government and merchants, leading to the development of the opium industry as a substitute form of remittance. As one contemporary summed up this “virtuous circle” as it then was in 1839:

From the opium trade the Honourable Company [EIC] have derived for years an immense revenue and through them the British Government and nation have also reaped an incalculable amount of political and financial advantage. The turn of the balance of trade between Great Britain and China in favour of the former has enabled India to increase tenfold her consumption of British manufacture; contributed directly to support the vast fabric of British dominion in the East, to defray the expenses of His Majesty’s establishment in India, and by the operation of exchanges and remittances in teas, to pour an abundant revenue into the British Exchequer and benefit the nation to an extent of £6 million yearly without impoverishing India.13

Thus, without wishing to dramatise or overstate the matter, Western merchants, with Britain and the “Honourable Company” in the lead, essentially addicted great swathes of the Chinese populous to opium. This made it a valuable and much sort-after commodity in the Celestial Empire, both creating and facilitating what some historians have described as an “Opium regime”.14 As a consequence, by the early decades of the nineteenth century opium had become the world’s single most lucrative commodity.15

To be sure, the opium trade, along with the social and economic problems it caused, was also partly owing to the increasingly weak and corrupt imperial system in China, which allowed opium to be landed and smuggled inland.16 Nevertheless, the EIC had always officially denied its involvement in the trade, preferring instead to engage private traders to do its dirty work in shipping the drug to the southern coast of China.17 However, as the EIC began to lose its grip on the China Trade, it was private agency houses like Jardine, Matheson & Co. that were all too happy to fill the supply and services gap. By the late 1830s they had become a major player in the Canton System, having established their own business relationships out of Calcutta and Bombay in shipping, storing, and trading opium (among numerous other items, including cotton). The exchange was complete: one form of gold had been successfully substituted for another; real gold had become “black gold” in this new transactional equation.

Of course, this extensive and sophisticated trade required an equally extensive and sophisticated infrastructure for its realisation. By the late eighteenth century the EIC had established a substantial production and manufacturing operation in Bengal, producing the coveted ‘Patna’ and ‘Benares’ varieties of opium that were shipped to China for consumption. Contemporary images illustrate the scale of this operation [Figs. 3 and 4]. The architectural infrastructure required was obviously no trifling matter. Indeed, such facilities, without which these imperial trade networks across South and Southeast Asia would not have been possible (along with their extraordinary wealth creation), were strewn throughout the region, from Bombay and Calcutta, to Singapore, Canton, and Hong Kong, and numerous other port cities in southern China. The actors involved were equally diverse, ranging from Parsi brokers (such as the famous
Jamsetjee Jejeebhoy, Western agents of various kinds (among which there were many Scots, including William Jardine and James Matheson), and Chinese cohong merchants – a veritable ‘chow-chow’ (mix) of collaborators. Jardine, Matheson & Co.’s special relationship with Jejeebhoy enabled them to run a line in ‘Malwa’ opium, alongside the standard Patna and Benares varieties. Again, this highlights the transnational, collaborative dimension of this ‘regime’ as it bound, in the words of Gregory Blue, “Indian peasants, British and Indian governments, a vast mass of Chinese consumers, and an array of Western, Parsee, and Sephardic, and most of all Chinese merchants in an immense revenue-generating system”.

As the trade in opium was not isolated, but part of a “triangular” system between India, China, and Britain, this infrastructure applied not only to opium. It included factories, docks, and warehouses, as well as business offices and clearing houses of various kinds that dealt in other goods related to the so-called ‘Country Trade’, such as silk, tea, cotton, pepper, tin, and rice. In short, this was an architectural infrastructure that propped up imperial trade as a going concern. Again, as Hancock has argued: “this expanding imperial environment did more than influence the conduct of merchants; in creating the need for an infrastructure – shipping and trading services, physical plant, and voluntary and involuntary settlement opportunities – it increasingly provided the precondition for much wealth creation… More
precisely, it provided opportunities for individuals to profit by building that infrastructure and offering those services which, in turn, set the stage for further wealth creation. Although referring to the British Atlantic world in the mid-eighteenth century, these words apply equally to Asia in the early nineteenth century.

The Jardine Matheson Archive held at Cambridge University Library reveals something of how this kind of architecture was created and utilised. As no architects seem to have been involved, few plans or drawings survive (if any were ever produced). What does survive, however, are numerous leases and building contracts, which describe the buildings owned and leased by Jardine, Matheson & Co. in a variety of ways. In one such contract – for the rebuilding of Creek Hong at Canton in 1827 – one gets details amounting to a minor building specification. A “drawing” is mentioned, but this appears to have been nothing more than a suggestive sketch, perhaps outlining the principal dimensions, as the contract states such things as “Door at the Entrance of the Hong to be of Teak, constructed and finished like that at the H. E. I. C. Factory”, or “front to be finished after the manner of Mr Sturgis’s Factory”. These contracts, usually entered into with local Chinese builders, specified everything from floor and wall surfaces, windows and doors, blinds, roofing, verandahs, security provision such as iron railing to windows and “treasury” strong rooms, as well as the procurement of materials. There is a peculiar connection to Australia in this too, where “300 Peculs [piculs] of New South Wales Red Cedar” are specified for purchase, suggesting an imperially networked understanding of the building’s materiality in addition to its function.

On the whole, the requirements for such buildings were simple to the point of plain, although, in the case mentioned above, the fronts to each of the factories were to have some pretence, with the “houses” having verandahs resting upon stone pillars, all windows to have Venetian blinds, and floors and fireplaces to be of marble. These were primarily business premises, designed purely for the perfunctory purposes of acquiring, accounting for, storing, and transhipping goods for profit. The leases and sub-leases between the Chinese cohong merchants of Canton (who owned the properties), Jardine, Matheson & Co., and others highlight the routine nature of these structures and the matter-of-fact esteem in which they were held and hired. This comes through in contemporary descriptions. As noted by a one-time resident of ‘old Canton’, these factories typically comprised three stories.

The lower floors were occupied by counting-rooms, godowns, and store-rooms, by the rooms of the Compradore [Chinese foreman], his assistants, servants and coolies, as well as by a massively built treasury of granite, with iron doors, an essential feature, there being no banks in existence. In front of each treasury was a well-paved open space, with table for scales and weights, the indispensable adjuncts of all money transactions … . The second floor was devoted to dining and sitting rooms, the third to bedrooms. As almost all were provided with broad verandahs and the buildings put up with care, they were quite devoid of ornamental work.

What is revealing about this account is that it describes the level to which local Chinese were both present and involved. Not only was the land upon which the factories resided owned by the Chinese cohong merchant class of Canton, and the buildings erected by Chinese contractors, but the day to day operations of the factories themselves were largely enabled by Chinese coolie labour under the supervision of Chinese compradors. Moreover, it was the cohong merchants who were in control of the trade on the Chinese side of this commercial relationship, again highlighting the complex proprietary nature of these factories as business premises, as well as belying any easy interpretation of them as culturally determined or specific.

Although most of the factories dating from the post-1822 fire were of this kind, they were not all so mundane. The EIC “English” factory – among the first on the scene – may be considered a rather lavish affair by comparison, with no small amount of architectural pretention. Owing to its mighty influence and reputation prior to 1833, the Company clearly had an image to uphold. Here, in its Canton factory, in the vast dining room overlooking the river, one could encounter “unbounded hospitality” amidst life-sized portraits, silver plate, and “a row of huge chandeliers”. Admittedly, the “sight” was “unique in that distant quarter of the world”.

Beyond appearances, when it came down to business, the accounting practices employed by the various collaborators in the China Trade were as regular, systematic, and perfunctory as the majority of the infrastructure itself, reflecting a certain mentality of abstraction (partition and record) common to the enterprise as a whole. Here there is a striking if not surprising synergy between the space of the ledger and that of the godown, as if the two were but different manifestations of the self-same phenomenon.
Creek Hong, where Jardine's operation was located, formed part of the so-called “Thirteen Factories” that lined the southern bank of Shamian in the Pearl River at Canton. Owing to the edict by the Chinese imperial government banning the importation of opium into China, the factories at Canton did not “officially” deal in the drug. Nevertheless, as the opium trade was tightly bound up with the ‘country’ and China trades in general, all these facilities were part of the same, region-wide infrastructure and trade network. As the records show, Jardine, Matheson & Co., like many other private agency houses, also had godowns in the Pearl River delta (Lintin Island) and on pre-cessation Hong Kong, where shipments of opium could be landed and distributed to smugglers for cash away from the prying eyes of officials. This cash was then used to purchase goods at Canton, where they were stored and shipped back to Britain, before being transhipped to markets further afield.

Finally a word on ships and shipping. Clearly, trade and transfer in the form of shipping was crucial to the development and maintenance of these networks and their spaces, not only across Asia, into Australasia, but also back to Britain. This invokes the historiographic notion of transoceanic, not merely transnational. These watery highways were the conduits through which such a trade was made economic and profitable in the first place. Indeed, shipping services were a fundamental part of Jardine, Matheson & Co.’s business. The company owned a number of ships, and it is clear from its extant archive that much time and resources were devoted to operating them. In many respects, the ships, as moving spaces of containment and transfer, were an extension of the factory spaces into which they off-loaded and up-lifted their cargoes. The existence and operation of the one was almost entirely dependent upon that of the other.

Tamson Pietsch has recently made an argument for considering ships as spaces of social production in consideration of what it means to speak of a globalised British world in the nineteenth century. That, indeed, the very construction of that ‘world’ was in many ways quickened and facilitated by the opportunities and advancement afforded by the empire’s various networks and structures via increased and mass transportation. Her argument concerns the movement of people and the effects of this on identity formation. However, if this idea were transposed in an economic sense, with the commodities (in a constant state of production, relocation, and consumption) understood as actors in a wider field of agency, then similar conclusions might be reached. These commodities were, in a sense, the proxy agents of Jardine, Matheson & Co., – objects that, invested as they were with disparately-sourced capital and insurance, and emblazoned with trademarks, were not only actors in forging new relationships (spatial, commercial, and social) but also the embodiment of new forms of British global identity. In other words, these networks were personified by merchants and their cargoes, thus concerning the nature and history of things. Moreover, it is through such connected if confined and channelled spaces that commercial goods not only flowed but ideas and knowledge too, highlighting a basis for the character and continuity of the region’s architecture mentioned above. As cultural and historical geographers might argue, the shifting space of the ship, as it plies the trade routes back and forth, is in effect creating a new kind of culturally-contingent spatiality, establishing an entwined dynamic between land and sea, factory and ship. This entanglement brings into focus what might be described as ‘littoral cultures’ of transaction and exchange, again highlighting the hybrid nature of these spaces. Here port technology and infrastructure were positioned precisely at the interface between these worlds of land and sea, offering a unique opportunity for analysis as points of contact, the mingling, as Glen O’Hara describes it, of blue and green histories.
This perhaps challenges a traditional notion of buildings as both architect- and object-centred creations, dissolving them as mere points of intersection and exchange within a much wider sphere of coexistence and multiple trajectories. In the case of “black gold”, this spatial agency could result, at one point in this multiplicity of trajectories, in social destruction and annihilation. Architectural historians, especially those concerned with global systems such as empire, would do well to pay much closer and more serious attention to such ‘architecture’.

Endnotes


3 This term was given to the ‘Malwa’ variety of opium shipped out of Bombay owing to the hue it acquired during manufacture. See F. Harcourt, “Black Gold: P&O and the Opium Trade, 1847-1914”, International Journal of Maritime History, 6, no. 1 (1994): 19.


6 Crucially, as John Darwin has observed, this “world system” that Britain had established by the nineteenth century was one that extended beyond formal empire and its territorial gains to include commercial networks that cemented Britain’s influence in the world through dominance in trade. See J. Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System 1830-1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).


8 This is something that Thomas Metcalf has recently attempted to analyse in relation to British India as a regional metropolitan hub vis-à-vis architectural production. See T. R. Metcalf, Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Arena, 1860-1920 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 46-67.


10 An interesting parallel to this ‘perfunctory’ architecture can be found in the way that Venetian colonies were linked through the occurrence of particular types of mundane infrastructures, such as public warehouses and arsenali. See M. Georgopoulou, Venice’s Mediterranean Colonies: Architecture and Urbanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 65-73.


13 Quoted in Greenberg, British Trade, 106-7.

14 Brock and Wakabayashi, Opium Regimes.

15 Trocki, Opium, 94.


18 Le Pichon, China Trade, 28.


22 Occasionally a drawing is mentioned, but none remain. For instance, see note of agreement between Jardine, Matheson & Co., and Gibb, Livingston & Co. over the rebuilding of “House No. 6” Imperial Hong, Canton, in 1854. Jardine Matheson Archive, Cambridge University Library: F14/4.

23 “Contract for Building Three Factories in the Creek Hong”, Jardine Matheson Archive, Cambridge University Library: A8/121/42.

24 “Contract for Building Three Factories in the Creek Hong”, Jardine Matheson Archive, Cambridge University Library: A8/121/42.

25 For instance, see Jardine Matheson Archive, Cambridge University Library: F14/1-18.


28 “Fan Kwae” at Canton, 31.

29 For instance, see A7 series in the Jardine Matheson Archive, Cambridge University Library.

30 For an account of these buildings, see Farris, “Thirteen Factories”: 66-83. See also P. A. Van Dyke and M. Kar-wing Mok, *Images of the Canton Factories 1780-1822* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2015). An interesting description can also be found in “Fan Kwae” at Canton, 20-34.

31 An example of this can be seen in Jardine, Matheson & Co’s opium accounts for 1835, where opium was landed at Hong Kong. See Jardine Matheson Archive, Cambridge University Library: A7/61. See also Blue, “Opium for China”, 33-4.


33 Farris, “Thirteen Factories”: 68-70.

34 Such architecture might profitably be analysed in a similar way to how George Kubler understood the geography of art in relation to Spanish mission architecture in America. Although this cannot be elaborated in detail here, it concerns questions of physical geography in relation to materials, building traditions, and centres of artistic and/or political influence, both globally and regionally. It asks not only how these established conditions from which a distinctive architecture was created, but also how it then became unique to a given region. Important here too is the idea of *Formenspaltung* (disintegration/dissociation of forms) that occurs when architectural forms begin to lose acquaintance with their original context. See “An Introduction to the Artistic Geography of the Americas: The Limits of Kubler’s Legacy”, in T. DaCosta Kaufmann, *Toward a Geography of Art* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 220-38. For Kubler on this, see *Santos: An Exhibition of the Religious Folk Art of New Mexico, with an Essay by George Kubler* (Fort Worth: Amon Carter Museum of Western Art, 1964); G. Kubler, “Two Modes of Franciscan Architecture: New Mexico and California”, in *Studies in Ancient American and European Art: The Collected Essays of George Kubler*, ed. T. F. Reece (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), 34-8.


36 Le Pichon, *China Trade*, 35. See also Jardine Matheson Archive, Cambridge University Library, series L and K.

37 For the importance of shipping services to the opium trade, see Trocki, *Opium*, 103-7.


39 O’Hara, “The Sea is Swinging”: 1112.


41 O’Hara, “The Sea is Swinging”: 1128.

42 This notion is taken from D. Massey, *For Space* (London: Sage, 2005), 63.